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Beyond Legal Rights? The Future of
Legal Rights and the Welfare System

Paul K. Legler*
l.

INTRODUCTION

Poverty policy has been subject to intense scrutiny over the
past decade. Some commentators have concluded that our
poverty policy has been a complete failure and that the
programs and laws which were designed to alleviate poverty
have actually had the opposite effect of which they were
intended, and have actually created more poverty. 1 Others
take the position that the war on poverty was never launched
to any significant degree. 2 Most commentators have concluded
that there has been a mixed degree of success and that we can
continue to make progress if we carefully analyze our successes
and failures and design programs carefully tailored with the
lessons of the past in mind. 3
Poverty program design and implementation have largely
been functions of the legislative and executive branches of
government, but they have also been affected to a large degree
by court challenges and rulings. The concept of welfare as a
legal right was developed by advocates for the poor and
implemented through both the legislature and the judiciary to
recognize the role and dignity of the individual in the welfare
system. Like the issue of poverty policy in general, the issue of

*
B.A., University of North Dakota, 1976; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1979;
M.P.A., Harvard University, 1991. Currently, a Senior Policy Analyst, Harvard
University, Center for Social Policy. I would like to thank Harvard Law School
Professor Lance Liebman for his encouragement and comment on this article.
1.
For a conservative view of the effects of poverty policy, see CHARLES
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984); GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
2.
See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY (1984).
:3.
See DAVID ELLWOOD, POCJR SUPPORT (1988); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); SHELDON H. DANZIGER & DANIEL H. WEINBERO,
Fit:HTINt: POVERTY (1986).
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the legal rights system in welfare has also begun to undergo
scrutiny.
Many advocates for the poor have been asking whether the
present legal rights system has been successful in protecting
the individual in the welfare system. Has the legal rights
system made the plight of those in poverty better or has it
contributed to their problems? Does the legal rights system
contribute to positive change of the social and economic
conditions keeping individuals in poverty, or does it actually
act as an impediment to change? Is it time to move away from
reliance on legal rights to protect the poor in a welfare state
and, if so, what kind of system do we want in its place? The
conclusions of those addressing these questions will likely differ
just as those examining our poverty programs as a whole have
differed. However, by looking at these questions from many
perspectives perhaps we can shed enough light on the matter
to begin to reach some understanding and agreement.
One theme of this article is that the legal rights system in
welfare does have severe limitations. First, it may have been
advanced by some as promising more than it can ever deliver
because legal rights alone can never alleviate poverty. Second,
the accomplishments of legal rights have been limited by
setbacks in the political struggle of the poor.
While those who criticize the legal rights system argue
that such a _system is defective because it is subject to
subversion by the political process, they are unable to offer any
alternative that would not be more abusive to the dignity of the
individual and subject to an even greater possibility of
subversion by the political process.
While recognizing these limitations, it is my thesis that the
legal rights system has improved the conditions of the poor and
that it also continues to be a necessary part of the base from
which social movements directed towards solving some of the
problems of the poor will emerge. The legal rights system must
be both completed and expanded because the scope of legal
rights will continue to determine the extent of dignity available
to the individual poor in the welfare state.
In part II, this article will trace the rise of the legal rights
in the United States welfare system. Part III will address the
criticisms of the legal rights system. Part IV will examine the
validity of these criticisms, and part V will pay particular
attention will be paid to issues of discretion and
decentralization which have recently been proposed as part of a
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necessary reform of the system. Finally, part VI suggests how
legal rights can be completed, expanded, and what the future
may hold.
II. THE RISE OF LEGAL RIGHTS
In order to address the issue of the direction of legal rights
in the welfare system, 4 it is helpful to briefly examine the
history behind the rise of legal rights. The modern welfare
system was created, in large part, at the birth of the New Deal.
The New Deal saw the enactment of the Social Security
Act which attempted to alleviate some of the social problems of
the depression era. The scope of the initial programs was very
limited. The Social Security Act was intended to provide
assistance to only certain categories of individuals that were
considered deserving of governmental assistance: the blind,
aged, disabled and dependent children. The means to do this
was through joint federal-state cooperation-cooperative
federalism-wherein the federal government provided financial
assistance and general guidelines to the states. Benefits for the
poor were based largely on "structured discretion" wherein the
states had broad latitude in the operation of the programs. 5
Welfare was viewed as either a privilege or a charity. The
conditions of eligibility set the outer limits for aid. But within
these limits, the state could largely give or withhold aid as it
saw fit and on any additional conditions it wished to impose. 6
This discretion extended down to the bottom level of the
bureaucracy where the social worker had broad discretion in
dealing with the individual.
The goal of the social worker was purported to be one of
rehabilitation of the poor individual. 7 The professional social
worker was to act in a professional manner with the best
interest of the individual in mind. In reality, the social worker
was subject to pressure and constraints of budgets, pressures

4.
I use the terms "welfare" or "welfare system" as a general reference to
what are traditionally considered welfare programs: Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security Insurance (SSI), food stamps and
general assistance. Medical assistance and various housing assistance programs
could also he included although they have somewhat different characteristics.
fi.
RAND RosENBLATr, Social Dutie;; and the Problem of Right:> in the American
Welfare System, THE POLITICS OF LAW 93 (1990).
6.
CARL WELLMAN, WELFARE RIGHTS 44 (1982).
7.
William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System,
92 YALE L.J. 1198 (198:1).
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from the bureaucracy above and social, and community
pressure. The result was often an abuse of discretion due to the
basing of decisions on considerations other than in the best
interest of the individual poor person. Instead, the decisions
were made on budgetary considerations based on the
communities concept of who was deserving or the workers
individual preference and identification with the individual
poor person. Blacks in the South were all but excluded from
participation in social welfare programs, 8 and eligibility
throughout the United States was often the result of arbitrary
or discriminatory decisions. 9
There was no recognized constitutional right to due
process. Although the Social Security Act made provision for
fair hearings, the hearing procedures were limited to programs
receiving federal funds and there was no requirement of a full
range of procedural protections nor requirements of a hearing
until after termination of benefits. The result was that the
action of the state, agency or individual welfare worker could
largely go unchallenged. The United States Supreme Court
never considered a case involving the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program until 1968. 10 Lawyers
for the poor were almost non-existent until the middle 1960s
and the states and local agencies could largely do what they
wanted with their welfare programs.
The legal rights movement in welfare was largely born out
of two avenues. First, advocates for the poor began to see the
legal system as a possible means to address the arbitrariness
and harassment existing in the system. Analogies were made to
the civil rights struggle which focused on the rights of
individuals in their dealing with the state and where litigation
had played an organizing role. 11 A number of lawyers for the
poor began to map out a strategy for using the courts to impose
some constraints on the system and to give power to the

8.
See THEDA SKOCPOL, The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of
Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988).
9.
See FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL, (1977); FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR 309 (1971).
10.
Barbara Sard, The Role of Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARINOHOUSE
REV. 367-:~88 (1988).
11.
ARYEN NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT 132 (1982).
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poor. 12
Second, theorists began to address the issue of rights to
government benefits. In an influential article published in the
Yale Law Journal, titled "The New Property," Charles Reich
argued that government benefits should be viewed as a
right. 13 Government had become a source of wealth and
government benefits of all sort were as important to individual
liberty as traditional property. As the "new property,"
government benefits should be accorded the same procedural
and substantive legal protection as traditional property. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s the courts began to address these
issues of both procedural and substantive protections.
Procedural protections for government welfare benefits
were recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly. 14 The Court recognized welfare as more
than a mere privilege and, while not explicitly recognizing it as
a "right," the Court recognized that welfare was
constitutionally protected and thus due process protections
applied. 15 While due process required a balancing of the
governmental interest in summary adjudication and the
recipients loss, due process did not require a judicial or
quasi-judicial trial. The Court did, however, recognize a need
for protections that would enable the recipient to challenge the
agency's actions. 16 The Court concluded that there was a right
to a hearing, with notice, and the right to appear personally. 17
The recipient also had the right to appear with counsel and
confront and cross-examine witnesses as well as have one's own
witnesses appear. Most importantly, perhaps, the Court
recognized the right to a hearing in AFDC cases prior to
termination of benefits. 18 This protected benefits for the
AFDC client who otherwise was at the mercy of the welfare
bureaucrat. Now the recipient could confront arbitrary or
unfair bureaucratic action without the risk of being terminated
and going without assistance until an appeal could reinstate
the grant. These procedural rights greatly increased the
possibilities to challenge welfare agency action.

12.
1:1.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POCJR IN COURT 48 (1990).
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. n;j (1964).
:397 U.S. 254 (1970).
!d. at 262·64.
!d. at 266-67.
!d. at 267-70.
lei. at 264-65.
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The substantive rights theme of legal rights was directed
in three areas. First, as part of the abandonment of the
rightJprivilege distinction, the right to privacy, travel, and some
degree of family autonomy was recognized. The Supreme Court
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 19 invalidated a one year residency
requirement on the basis of a right to travel. In King v.
Smith, 20 the Supreme Court rejected the so-called man in the
house rules. Further, midnight raids were prohibited by lower
federal courts. 21
Second, the concept of welfare benefits as a legal
entitlement arose. 22 As a legal entitlement the recipient had a
right to receive benefits within the statutory authority of the
federal government and judicial process could be used to review
the policies and decisions of the states. No longer could the
states and localities make up their own eligibility criteria as
there had to be uniformity in the system. No longer was
welfare to be seen as a matter of official discretion.
This change to viewing welfare benefits as an entitlement
turned the system around from one of gratuitous charity to one
of giving the individual power to assert a right to benefits. It
recognized that welfare like many government benefits for the
non-poor, such as tax benefits, credits, or Social Security
Retirement, was to be based upon law and not official
discretion.
The third direction of the legal rights theme was aimed
towards obtaining support for the legal rights theory as a
constitutional right. Proponents wanted the courts to recognize
the right to some minimum or subsistence income. 23 This
third direction of the substantive legal rights theme met
without success. In Dandridge v. Williams, 24 the Supreme
Court dashed the hope that there would be a constitutionally
based right to any kind of bare income. 25 The Court ruled that
welfare legislation was to be tested under the traditional

19.
20.

894 U.S. 618 (1969).
892 U.S. 809 (1968).
21.
It was not uncommon for welfare "investigators" to make late night visits
to recipients' homes to see if the father was in the home and therefore the family
not eligible for AFDC.
22.
Sard, supra note 10, at 870-72.
2:3.
See LAWRENCE, supra note 12, at 49.
:{97 U.S. 471 (1970).
24.
25.
See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONUING To AMERICA 186 (1989).
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concept of equal protection, that is, minimum rationality. 26
The poor were not to be given special consideration under the
Equal Protection Clause of the constitution.
While not going as far as many of those involved in the
struggle wanted, the legal rights development made three
lasting changes in the welfare system. First, it established the
notion of welfare as a legal entitlement. Welfare would never
again be seen as a privilege or gratuity. If the government
created benefits the individual had an enforceable interest in
those benefits. Second, eligibility was federalized. States could
no longer impose their own discretionary eligibility criteria on
the operation of the federal programs. And third, fairness was
ensured by due process procedures. Recipients could challenge
decisions concerning their lives and enforce their rights.
Ill.

THE CRITIQUE OF LEGAL RIGHTS

The legal rights movement, while making some long
lasting changes, failed to address other concerns of the poor. It
did nothing to address the adequacy of benefit levels. In
Rosado v. Wyman/ 7 the Supreme Court refused to interfere
with the states adoption of their own benefit levels. States
continue to set benefit levels which do not even meet their
standard of need. 28 In many states the benefits continue to be
woefully inadequate. 29
The use of rules which were promoted to restrict discretion
were often turned on their head especially in the Reagan Era
when the rules were used to restrict access to benefits. The
rigid rules were often used to alienate clients as verification
requirements increased beyond any logical reason. There were
so many requirements that many recipients simply gave up
trying to meet all the requirements imposed by the rules.
Quality control pressured workers to focus on technical
requirements rather than helping those in need. As a result,
many of the eligible clients never received benefits. 30

26.
Dandridge, 897 U.S. at 484.
27.
897 u.s. 397 (1970).
Overview vf Entitlement Programs, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
28.
House of Representatives, 597 (1991).
ld. at 599. For a three person family maximum AFDC benefits are $124.00
29.
in Alabama, $190.00 in Louisiana, and $120.00 in Mississippi.
30.
See MICHAEL SOSIN, Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980 FIGHTING
POVERTY (1986).
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Due process rights were not meaningful in many cases
because of the maldistribution of power between the state and
the recipient. Joel Handler31 has argued that in order for due
process to work a number of conditions must be met: (1) the
client must be aware of the injury; (2) the client must think
that the agency is at fault; (3) the client must be aware that
there is a remedy; (4) the client must have the resources to
pursue her case; and (5) the advantages of pursuit must
outweigh the costs. 32 Handler maintains that due process
protections are not meaningful because these conditions rarely
exist.
Legal rights have recently been more and more narrowly
construed by the Supreme Court. 33 Unless the legislature has
been very explicit, the Court is unwilling to extend any
protection beyond the legislatures' clear pronouncements. The
term "managerial formalism" has been used to describe a
formalistic process that denies the claim of the poor against
government on grounds of deference to the democratic process
unless there is explicit legislative and constitutional commands
and defers to the "expertise" of legislators and bureaucrats on
social welfare issues. 34
The conservative right has had a great deal of influence in
determining the extent to which the poor will receive
entitlements. Not only has the legislature restricted access to
benefits by narrowing the eligibility criteria but the executive
agencies have used rulemaking authority to both restrict rules
protecting the poor and to authorize greater agency control over
the lives of the poor. The concept of entitlement is subject to
subversion because its protection is shallow. It is dependent
upon the political struggle to define the extent of the
entitlements.
The critique of legal rights from the critical legal studies
perspective goes even further. 35 The critical legal studies view
31.
Joel Handler has written extensively about poverty law and poverty
lawyers. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1990);
JOEL F. HANDLER, LAST RESORTS (1983); JOEL F. HANDLER, PuBLIC INTEREST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978); JOEL F. HANDLER, LAWYERS
AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE
PooR (1972).
:12.
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION 22 (1986).
:1::l.
RoSENBLATT, supra note 5, at 95-102.
:34.
!d. at 96.
;{fi.
See DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (1990)
(an overview of critical legal studies).
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argues that the struggle for legal rights has done more harm
than good. 36 In this view the legal rights struggle has
legitimized oppression by deflecting the political struggle into
meaningless confrontations with the bureaucracy. The legal
struggle does no good because it ignores underlying symptoms
while maintaining existing social and power relationships.
William Simon has argued that the substantive rights
theme has actually inhibited redistributive efforts that
otherwise would have been supported by a broader liberal
program. 37 He also argues that legal rights has not lead to
increased participation rates but has lead to increased
bureaucratization and a move from a social worker model to
clerks. 38 Law and management concerns have transformed the
system wherein eligibility is based on rules, not standards, fact
finding has been formalized, and quality control is used against
the client. He proposes a return to standards, decentralization
and downward professionalization. 39
IV.THE VALIDITY OF THE CRITIQUE

It is true that the promise many saw for legal rights never
materialized. Advocates of legal rights in welfare were too
optimistic because legal rights alone never had the potential to
alleviate poverty. However, like the re-evaluation of poverty
policy in the past decade the critique of legal rights has often
gone too far. Many critics equate the failure of the uncompleted
process of implementing the system of legal rights as a failure
of the entire concept. In my view, it is not the rights concept
that is the obstacle to the alleviation of poverty. The obstacle to
the alleviation of poverty is the political powerlessness of the
poor. The poor have, for the most part, lost the political
struggle and the scope of legal rights is often determined by
that political struggle. The legal rights system has not
decreased the power of the poor, it has acted to check total
powerlessness and the plight of the poor would be worse

86.
See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1 (19H4); Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 708-09 (1980).
:n. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38
STAN. L. REV. 14:n (1986); see also William H. Simon, Legal Informality and
Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384 (1985).
38.
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
1. REV. 1 (1985).
See Simon, supra note 7.
39.
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without a legal rights system.
While it is true that legal rights has faced many obstacles
and setbacks, the critics fail to acknowledge its
accomplishments. Contrary to William Simon's view, legal
rights has opened the welfare system to participation by
millions. This has been evident to almost all who have been
involved in legal rights struggles. The overturning of two
restrictions alone, the substitute parent rule and the residency
requirement rule, opened up the system to between 300,000
and 400,000 poor people. 40 Legal rights challenges in food
stamp cases resulted in the poor receiving hundreds of millions
of dollars of food. 41 Legal righthas expanded welfare roles
because people of long standing eligibility could now get
benefits. 42 As a consequence, millions have received benefits
so that they could better feed, clothe, and house their families.
Criticism of the due process protections in legal rights
ignores the fact that the adversary system did help many win
important substantive rights. The due process protections also
have a magnifying effect on the entire system. Arbitrary and
mean-spirited denials have been reduced simply because of the
threat of appeals that exists. The bureaucrats have been forced
to play by the rules because of the watchdog effect of clients
who are aware of their rights and are backed by legal services
attorneys. Thus, the adversary system is beneficial even to
those poor who do not use it directly. Lawyers for the poor are
well aware of how one person's success in the adversary system
can change the way an entire agency interprets a rule or deals
with the issue that was challenged.
Bureaucratization has largely come from the concerns of
management and not simply as a result of legal rights. Partly,
it is simply the result of increased numbers to be served within
tight budgets. Bureaucratization has occurred throughout
government and is not limited to the welfare system. Legal
rights in welfare has played only a minor role in the
bureaucratization of the system. Criticism of legal rights from
critical legal studies, while perhaps offering much in terms of
our understanding of the legal system as a whole, offers no
alternative to legal rights that is even remotely viable at this
time. At times the criticism amounts to nothing more than a

40.
41.

42.

EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM, 203 (1978).
Id. at 205.
P!VENS & CLOWARD, supra note 9, at 3:-34
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legal realism view coupled with utopianismY Ed Sparer has
argued that the criticism of legal rights from critical legal
studies has tended towards exaggeration and has not
recognized the potential contribution of rights. 44 While rights
and entitlement programs can occasionally be used to
legitimize oppression, they are also affirmations of human
value. 45 Until the critical legal studies movement develops
more concrete alternatives we can hardly afford to abandon a
legal rights system which, in the view of most practitioners,
does benefit the poor in many tangible ways. Of course, the
criticism of legal rights has also come from the far right who
feel that the concept of legal rights in welfare is wrong because
welfare should be demeaning. 46 While I recognize that such
arguments exist, it is not the purpose of this paper to address
these broader poverty policy considerations that, in my view,
have been largely discredited by others. 47
The critique of legal rights does challenge us to
re-evaluate, in more detail, two specific issues concerning legal
rights, discretion and decentralization.

V.

LEGAL RIGHTS, DISCRETION AND DECENTRALIZATION

One result of a critical look at legal rights has been a
re-evaluation of discretion. The view expressed by a number of
legal theorists is that discretion is not only a necessary part,
but a desirable component of a social welfare system. 48 The
discretion issue is complicated, and one that deserves careful
analysis before acceptance or rejection.
Discretion in welfare generally means that there is an
element of individual judgment in one's decisions or actions. It

4:j.
For a critique of critical legal studies, see David A. Price, Taking Rights
Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271 (1989);
Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be a Radical, :j6 STAN. L. REV. 247
(1984).
Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
44.
Structure: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, as STAN. L.
REV. 508 (1984).
.
4fi.

ld.

46.
See MURRAY, supra note 1.
47.
See, e.g., MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESEHVJNn Poem:
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989); ELLWOOD, supra
ET AL., THE MEAN SEASON (1987).
48.
HANDLEH, supra note ;j2. Apparently, Handler has
somewhat. See HANDLER, supra note :n. William Simon has
discretion. Simon, supra note :n.

FROM THE WAR ON
note ;j; FRED BLOCK,
reversed his position
also argued for more
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is not to say that there are no rules but that in an area of
conduct generally covered by rules, the rule's dictates are
indeterminate allowing for the exercise of judgment. 49
In the welfare system discretion can occur at multiple
levels. It is important for those proposing more discretion and
those opposed to it to specify the particular level of discretion
to which they are referring. Discretion can exist at the state
level, agency level, or the street level. At the state level
discretion allows the individual state to both decide whether
certain programs will be implemented and/or how the programs
will be run. Discretion at the agency level is usually more
limited but agencies are sometimes given discretion on the
same basis as states to decide certain facets of an
implementation policy. At the street level discretion allows the
person who has the actual face to face encounter with the client
to make a judgment decision affecting the client.
At the state or agency level, discretion is seen as a positive
goal in that it allows for experimentation and innovation. 50
Few claim to have all of the answers to the difficult questions
about how social welfare programs should be operated.
Experimentation and innovation are necessary to test different
proposals while the states serve as laboratories for
experimentation. Discretion also allows programs to be tailored
to meet local economic and social conditions, such as local labor
market conditions. A work program in the inner-city may need
to be operated differently than a work program in a rural area
because the employment conditions facing clients are quite
different.
Some discretion at the street level is a fact of life. 51 The
clients' circumstances, needs, and abilities to interact with the
street level worker are subject to incalculable differences. It is
impossible, even if it is desirable, to write rules to cover every
single possibility facing the street level worker dealing with the
client. In fact, if there are too many rules, the worker would
simply use discretion out of necessity because the volume of
rules constantly being revised makes it impractical to use.
49.
Robert E. Goodin, Welfare, Rights and Discretion, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
2a2 (1986).
See Newstock Ice Co. v. Liefman, 285 U.S. 262 (19a2) (Brandeis, J.,
50.
dissenting).
51.
For a valuable analysis of discretion at "street level," see MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES
(1980).
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Emergency assistance is a good example of the need for
some discretion in the system. 52 Emergency assistance is an
optional component of the AFDC program, and it allows for
differences in the needs of individual clients. People are subject
to unforeseeable events. Their household goods may be
destroyed in a fire, their furnace may break down, they may be
faced with unexpected evictions or utility shutoffs. Emergency
assistance provides a cash supplement to their ordinary AFDC
grant to allow them to deal with the emergency. Since the term
"emergency" cannot be defined with precision there must be an
element of judgment exercised by the street level worker to
determine both what constitutes an emergency and what
amount of cash is necessary to alleviate the immediate need.
Another example of the need for discretion is in the
determination of what constitutes a disability under the Social
Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income
programs. Whether someone is or is not disabled can be
dictated by rule to a certain extent and the Social Security
Administration has done so by creating rules stating that
certain medical conditions will automatically be considered a
disability. 53 However, it is impossible to create a rule for every
conceivable medical condition that could be disabling. Since the
determination of disability under the law involves vocational as
well as medical considerations for most claimants, the Social
Security Administration has promulgated another set of rules
in the form of tables or "grids" to take into consideration
various statutory factors such as age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity. 54 This has all
been done in an attempt to add consistency and predictability
to the decisions of the administrative law judges making the
disability determination.
While the Social Security Administration has attempted to
limit the discretion of the law judges by the promulgation of
rules, advocates for the disabled have generally attempted to
expand the discretion arguing that people are entitled to an
individualistic determination and that rules alone cannot
52.
Joel F. Handler argues that a discretionary system for emergencies and
special needs should have been maintained to a greater extent than it was. While
some states have maintained emergency assistance, others have not. See JOEL F.
HANDLER, LAST RESORTS (1988); Joel F. Handler, Discretion in Social Welfare: The
Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270 (1988).
ii8.
20 CFR § 404, Subpart P, App. 1.
ii4.
20 CFR § 404, Subpart P, App. 2.
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provide the individual assessment that is necessary. Also,
administrative law judges have sufficient independence to
make decisions without undue political or public pressure and
without abusing their discretion by denying benefits based
upon budgetary considerations rather than the disability
determination. In this context some discretion may be viewed
as a desirable thing from the client's perspective. It allows the
client's case to be decided upon an individualistic assessment
which includes many considerations that rules, no matter how
detailed, can provide. Individual assessments are necessary in
determinations such as disability cases because of the elements
of observation and judgment in the determination.
Discretion allows the street level financial worker to
consider individual needs and differences of the welfare client.
There are areas where the application of a rule may not be
clear in the individual case and the financial worker will then
have some degree of discretion to decide how to apply the rule.
A responsible financial worker can consider the client's
individual needs and make a decision in the best interest of the
client. Questions arise as to whether the areas where discretion
is given need to be expanded and whether the discretion will be
responsibly exercised.
Some writers have argued that discretion should be
broadly expanded. In his book, The Conditions of Discretion,
Joel F. Handler55 argues that the system of rights and
procedural remedies developed over the last several decades
have not worked, that the system is conceptually inadequate
and that we should create a system wherein decisions are
discretionary. 56 Due process has failed both because of the
maldistribution of power and because it has conceptual
flaws. 57 The formal adversary structure under due process
should fade as a new discretionary system arises. The
alternative would foster cooperation and increase
communication between agency and client.
Handler uses the Madison, Wisconsin special education
program as a model for the system that he proposes. He poses
four "conditions of discretion" necessary for the system: (1) a
decentralized system which would encourage the creative use of

55.
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY (19H6).
56.

fi7.

ld. at 19-40.
ld. at 7.
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discretion; (2) a changed role of the bureaucracy wherein
incentives and structures at agency level would make the
bureaucracy part of the community; (3) social movement groups
at a grass roots level that would be seen as creating
communicative conflict, not adversarial conflict; and (4)
cooperative decision-making as in informed consent in its ideal
form. 58 Handler is admittedly optimistic but sees the
possibility of a more humane system promoting understanding,
cooperation and communication in place of one where the
powerlessness of the individual is increasing. 59
While there is a place for limited discretion in the welfare
system, the dangers of its abuse will continue until some
fundamental changes have occurred in our political
environment. The problems of discretion, to a large extent,
have not changed from the pre-legal rights era although some
new dangers have arisen.
At the street level, clients in a discretionary system are
faced with a sense of powerlessness as they confront the
bureaucrats who hold the key to their perceived wellbeing. The
self-regard of clients decreases as the power of the bureaucrats
increases. Clients are, therefore, subject to possible
manipulation and exploitation.
Arbitrariness, while probably less common than perceived,
is a problem simply because it is perceived as a possibility.
Clients feel that the decision, whatever it is, is arbitrary
because they have no way of knowing how the criteria for the
decision will be applied in their case.
Having represented many clients in seeking assistance
under emergency assistance programs, I have seen how it can
be used to reward "good," "deserving" clients in the
bureaucrat's eyes and used to punish the "bad," "undeserving"
clients. Granted, the system is not always abused, but the
potential is always present. Generally, the more room for
discretion in social welfare the greater the potential for abuse
that exists under the present social and political conditions.
At a state level, the AFDC program has always allowed
some discretion. States have always had many options which
they could choose to implement. For example the states, set
their own benefit levels with the result that a state like
Mississippi could set a monthly grant at $120.00 for a family of
58.
59.

!d. at 1-15.
!d. at 300.
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three 60 and states have, in the past, been able to choose
whether to provide benefits to two parent families where both
parents are unemployed. 61
In my home state of North
Dakota, individual counties are given wide discretion in the
general assistance program in determining eligibility criteria.
The result, not unexpectedly, is that the counties create an
almost totally discretionary system and almost no one ever
receives any assistance. Discretion granted to states and
agencies makes it more difficult to use broad-based political or
legal action to challenge the inadequacies of the programs.
One of the major reasons that discretion is abused in
welfare is simply because of budgetary considerations.
Legislators looking for areas to save money, look to the welfare
system. Administrators in response to statutory dictates, are
bound to provide certain minimal benefits and have only a
narrow range in which to make cuts. Wherever there is
discretionary spending of money the agency will make cuts
thereby reducing benefits. This desire to control spending by
reaching discretionary areas extends all the way down to street
level. In many instances the street level bureaucrat would like
to provide assistance to help those in need but they are facing
direct and implicit pressure to use whatever discretion they
have to prevent further expenditure of money.
Another reason that discretion is so often abused is simply
due to irresponsible administrators and street level workers.
By irresponsible, I mean that they are unduly affected by
pressures to conform their behavior to what they perceive to be
the public expectation regardless of what is right or what is
best for the recipient. They perceive a public expectation that
they should keep the poor in their place because the poor are
poor due to character or cultural defects. This public
expectation has been created, in part, because of the success of
the right in characterizing the problems of poverty as cultural
rather than as one caused by economic conditions 62 or class
divisions. 63 In this view, the poor are the undeserving and

60.
For a look at poverty in rural Mississippi, see KEN AULE'ITA, THE
UNDERCLASS 13 (1982).
61.
H.R. COMMIITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., Overview of
Entitlement Programs 566 (1991).
62.
ELLWOOD, supra note :3 (identifies the causes of poverty as largely economic
in origin).
See BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING (1989) (an analysis of how
63.
class division affects poverty.).
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therefore, if there is any room for discretion all decisions
should go against them.
In order for discretion to work in social welfare you must
have both responsible administrators or bureaucrats and
reliable and adequate budgets. Some possible means to bring
about those criteria are discussed in the next section.
As for Handler's conditions for discretion, they are largely
a utopian dream insofar as he proposes a system that promises
more than an extremely limited role. We need visions of a new
and different future to challenge us to change in the present.
The danger is that some may come to believe that we can
create the discretionary system now and the system will then
change people's behavior. Handler's system fails on a number
of counts.
First, Handler's system is dependent upon a much
reformed bureaucracy. He sees a better educated and more
professionalized bureaucrat. Handler is not alone here as
others have called for professionalism as part of the remedy for
what supposedly ails the legal rights system. 64 But that is not
going to happen in the welfare system until there is both a new
attitude about welfare and adequate budgets. Better trained
and more professionalized bureaucrats will not emerge from
current conditions and the present system.
Second, it is difficult to see how the street-level bureaucrat
is going to be professionalized given that she/he is faced with
routinization of tasks due to the sheer number of poor.
Professionalization at the street level would require a
revolutionary change in the delivery of social-welfare
benefits. 65 While this change may be desirable, it would be
folly to move towards a discretionary system believing that
professionalism of the bureaucrat is going to follow.
Bureaucratic accountability will decrease if discretion is
increased. Given the present social and political climate
discretion would continue to largely be used as a way to deny
benefits to keep welfare budgets down. As discretion increases
it becomes more difficult to challenge agency or bureaucratic
action because courts will almost always defer to agency action
where the agency is given discretion.
Discretion in the welfare system is inherently attractive

64.

William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System,

92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 244 (1988).
65.
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with the public because the public generally feels that one
function of a welfare system is to separate the deserving poor
from the undeserving poor. Since each individual feels that
they would be able to make such a determination based upon
their own criteria for who is deserving, they see nothing wrong
with giving such discretion to someone else. In reality,
however, the criteria one endorses for determining the
deserving varies from person to person. More discretion creates
a larger zone in which the bureaucrat can exercise his or her
own personal criteria for making determinations.
Before we impose more discretion in social welfare we
should ask whether it would be tolerated in other areas of
governmental actions affecting us as individuals. Would we
tolerate more discretion in the tax system? Would we want an
Internal Revenue Service agent to have discretion in
determining whether we get tax deductions or credits? Most
people would not want a government official to have
discretionary power over their lives unless they knew that the
discretion would be exercised fairly and responsibly and with
their input or participation in the decision making. By the
same token, we should provide the same considerations to the
poor. Why we do not is largely a function of the current social
and political climate which sees the poor as different than the
rest of society. Discretion is most dangerous in social welfare
programs involving the poor precisely because the poor are
unable to participate in the decision making process.
Participation requires that one possess power; or otherwise, one
is solely dependent upon the other party to exercise fairness
and goodwill. In social welfare, clients are presently dealing
from a powerless position.
Discretion may well work in Madison's special education
program, 66 but Madison is a poor experimental model for the
rest of the country at this time. As anyone who has been to
Madison will realize, it is a rather unique social and political
environment. Most importantly, however, special education is
viewed differently in Madison than the way other types of
welfare are viewed in the rest of the nation. Bureaucracy
tends to reflect the prevailing social and political outlook and
society views welfare as very different from special education
because welfare carries a stigma that special education does

66.

JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CoNDITIONS OF DISCHETION, ch. 4 (191-16).
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not. Handler's system requires that the welfare system undergo
a fundamental change in ideology, structure and organization,
yet he fails to address how this will be brought about in the
political process.
Handler admits that a discretionary system requires a
sharing of power between the service provider (in most cases,
the state) and the client. His system requires that the
bureaucracy will promote and foster the sharing of power.
However, those that have power are much less likely to share
it voluntarily than he assumes. The poor will only gain power
in a slow process of individual empowerment through assertion
of their rights and dignity and the aggregation of that power in
social and political movements.
In conclusion, there is nothing inherently wrong with
discretion in social welfare and, in fact, it is desirable in many
respects. It will, by necessity, have a place where highly
individualistic decisions are required, such as in disability
determinations where rules cannot address every individual
circumstance and observation and judgment are necessary. The
use of discretion, however, must be limited wherever there is a
potential for abuse.
Given the present social and political climate the danger of
abuse of discretion in the area of social welfare is great. It is
not enough to simply say that we need a few conditions to be
put in place and a discretionary system will work. There must
be more than changes in structural conditions, there must be
deeper changes both in how society views the poor and the
extent to which the poor have control in the political arena.
When that happens, there is a possibility for responsible
bureaucrats and adequate budgets so that discretion will be
used in a responsible manner with the poor participating in the
decision-making.
Many theorists have also called for decentralization of
welfare. Decentralization has been pushed from the political
left as well as from the right. 67 Decentralization, like
discretion, allows for judgment to be exercised in the operation
of social welfare programs. Decentralization, however, goes

67.
Simon and Handler argue for decentralization from the left, creating a
strange marriage with the Reagan Administration which argued for decentralization
from the right. See William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1988); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF
DISCHE'J'ION (19R6).
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beyond discretion in that it usually involves a transfer of the
funding mechanism to the state or local level as well. Insofar
as it allows for experimentation, innovation and flexibility in
these programs it is attractive. Certainly we need to see new
approaches and experiments in order to develop a better
system.
There is also desirability in tailoring programs to meet
local conditions. In theory, decentralization allows for greater
local participation in decision-making. The hope is that it will
lead to greater cooperation and human interaction. Under the
present political realities, however, decentralization faces many
of the same flaws as discretion.
General Assistance 68 is the ultimate decentralized
component of social welfare. There are no federal rules or
funding and even the states transfer much or all of these roles
to the county level. Given the social and political pressures on
the welfare system the grants where the programs do exist are
extremely small and many states and/or counties have no
general assistance at all. 69
The chief problem impeding decentralization of the federal
welfare programs as a viable alternative is budgetary
considerations. The current social and political climate places
social welfare funding low on the list of priorities for state
government, and the states do not have the revenue raising
capacity of the federal government. In addition, there is
competition between states which has a greater effect on social
welfare spending than in other spending areas. Competition for
new business creates a call for the lowest possible taxes and
thus state government looks toward social welfare budgets as
an area to curtail spending. The view is that low taxes attract
business while the degree that the poor, homeless, disabled,
and elderly are taken care of is of little concern to business. 70
In addition to the competition to lower taxes many states also
compete to keep social spending low with the belief that higher
spending would simply attract more poor to the state. 71
The push towards discretion and decentralization as an
alternative to the legal rights system is dangerous because it is

68.
69.
70.

State-run welfare programs are avaliable for those not eligible for AFDC.
MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 283-85 (1986).
See e.g., EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE ;17 (1991).
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likely to be subverted and used against the poor. Handler,
Simon and others argue for a restructuring of major social
welfare programs to allow for their approach. 72 However, it is
not enough to base discretion and decentralization on simply
structural changes. They underestimate the extent to which
major political and social change would be necessary for their
vision to work. Until that happens increased discretion and
decentralization would be unlikely to serve the interests of the
welfare community. Legal rights would be reduced and this
would leave the poor with even less power than they presently
possess.
VI.

COMPLETING AND EXPANDING LEGAL RIGHTS

Although the promise of legal rights is yet to be fulfilled,
legal rights have the potential of empowering the individual.
When I speak of legal rights as empowering the individual, I
mean the use of legal rights as a means of giving the individual
power in his or her relationship with the state or against
powerful private and corporate interests. It is a means of
forcing authority to recognize the power of the individual. This
is not to mean that this power alone will enable the poor to lift
themselves out of poverty. As I have stated, that will require a
social and political transformation that is beyond the scope of
the legal system alone. However, the empowerment of
individuals can be the first step on the road to a change of
consciousness. This in turn can lead to an increase in political
power.
Those lawyers in legal services who have day to day
contact with great numbers of poor see many instances in
which clients are empowered when they assert their legal
rights. I don't mean to imply that the assertion of legal rights
has an effect on all clients or even on the majority but it
happens much more frequently than critics of legal rights will
admit. It is especially prevalent in civil rights and welfare
cases. I have witnessed many instances where minorities have
used their legal rights to challenge the power structure in civil

72.
See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People,
the State and the
Modern/Postmodern search for the Dialogic Community, 85 UCLA L. REV. 999
(1988).
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rights cases. 73 Both individually and collectively civil rights
cases can be used to empower minorities, building a sense of
cohesion and creating a consciousness of the potential for
power.
The same process can occur in welfare cases. Clients are
often invigorated and awakened by their own actions in
asserting themselves and appealing an adverse agency action.
They are questioning authority, often for the first time, which
can change them and their perception of their role with the
state. They will also tell others of their experience which will
give others the courage to assert their own rights. Again, this
is not to suggest that the empowerment that comes with
asserting legal rights happens in a great percentage of cases.
However, it has happened often enough so that the
consciousness of many of the poor have been changed. It is part

73.
I will give one example from my own experience to illustrate the point.
Three related families of migrant farmworkers had come from Texas to the Red
River Valley of Minnesota as they annually do to work in the sugar beet fields.
They secured housing in an apartment complex by entering into a lease with the
resident manager. The owner of the apartments showed up some weeks later and,
discovering the color of the skin of her new tenants, ordered them out stating that
she didn't want any "damn Mexicans" in her building. The farmworkers were
forced to leave the apartment and were unable to find other housing in the area
and therefore lost their contract for working in the sugar beet fields. As usually
happens in these kinds of cases, the owner denied making any such remarks and
said they left for other reasons. The owner rigorously contested all the allegations.
The matter came up for trial in November the following year. This meant that the
farmworkers had to leave their work in Texas, travel across the country and stay
for several days in order to present their case in court and at best, have a chance
to recover rather minimal damages that would not cover their time and costs. At
that time in an action under the state's human rights laws the farmworkers were
limited to actual damages. I discussed these facts with them as well as the fact
that this was a case of their word against the owner and her witnesses and that
the local judge could easily fmd against them. These factors were quickly dismissed
by the family members. They weren't in this for the money and, in fact, they did
not expect to win. They were coming for the trial because they felt that what was
done to them was not right and if they stood up for their legal rights they would
demonstrate to the owner that they should not be treated that way. If their
lawsuit did not win them damages they could at least help other farmworkers who
might face the same discrimination. I remember vividly the chilly November day
before the trial when I met with all twenty-one family members who came up
from Texas to assert their rights. We met and sat at a picnic table in the park
where they were sleeping in their cars because they could not afford the cust of
motel rooms. They were totally resolute, not because they believed that the system
would work, but because their legal rights gave them the power to bring the
owner into court to be confronted by them as to the wrong against them. In this
respect, the process of asserting legal rights was empowering for these people.
While we were able to get a favorable judgment, it really did not matter so much
to them as having the process by which to assert their rights.
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of the process by which they come to think of entitlement
benefits not as a charity but as a right that they can enforce.
They realize that they can question the authority of the
bureaucrat and the state. It is this realization that creates a
basis for change and which can be used to foster social
movements. The fact remains that the legal rights system in
welfare has worked for millions of people. They were granted
benefits because they met the criteria of definite rules and they
had a due process system to back them up if they were not
treated as the law required. Many, if not most, of those persons
were able to receive their benefits without undue disregard of
their privacy due to protections of legal rights. Legal rights
enabled them to have some dignity during a difficult time.
While the legal rights system in welfare has made life
better for many, the promise of legal rights for the individual
has admittedly fallen short of its goal in two respects. First, it
does not work for all individuals because some are unaware of
their rights or unable to assert them. There is a continuous
need to provide education about rights both on an individual
and community basis. As to social welfare rights this requires a
continuous effort because the recipients of social welfare are
continuously changing as new people fall into poverty to
replace those who rise out of it.
For those unable to assert their rights on their own we
must provide lawyers with training in welfare law. 74 This
requires expanded legal services for the poor. The effort to
replace the trained staff legal services attorney with other
forms of legal services delivery systems such as mandatory
pro-bono attorneys and judicare, should be resisted. While
there is a valuable place for pro-bono attorneys and other
delivery systems in legal services for the poor, the place is not
in providing service in welfare law. It is difficult to turn over
representation in welfare cases to attorneys who have little
training in an area that requires special training and expertise
which comes from extensive involvement in this specialty.
Second, the legal rights system has been subverted
through the political process in this country. The subversion
has come from the effort to restrict legal rights by legislative
and executive action. The past decade has seen a gradual
erosion of many legal rights both by limiting the entitlements
74.
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of the poor and the use of rules against the poor. This erosion
of legal rights is a product of the political struggle and the
same legal rights that can be limited through the political
process can also be expanded by political struggle. This
problem is not something that is inherently defective in legal
rights any more than any ot}J.er alternative system. The
political struggle will always exist and the struggle must be
viewed as a continual process with the potential for subversion
no matter what the system. Legal rights, however, can
empower those involved in the political struggle, making each
successive struggle on a different level. The level of the
struggle is changed as legal rights grow because once a legal
right is established it becomes more difficult to take it away. It
can be subverted to a degree but the right enters the
consciousness of the possessor of the right and the longer it
exists the more difficult it becomes to eliminate.
While empowerment through legal rights alone will never
eliminate poverty it can be an essential component of a process
which will reduce poverty. Those involved with the legal
system as judges, lawyers, and legal advocates must constantly
be aware of the potential for empowerment that does exist.
They must not only use legal rights as a tool for individual
change but must also link that individual empowerment with
the political struggle. This requires a continuous dialogue
between those in the legal system and the poor on both the
potential and present limitation of legal rights. 75 Those
asserting their rights must be aware that the assertion of legal
rights as an individual must be linked with the ongoing
political struggle. In this respect the party must be made
aware of others who are having the same problems and of
groups that are working towards political change on the issues
of concern to the party.
The assertion of legal rights, if approached in this way, can
be instrumental in developing social movements. Individual
empowerment if linked to the larger political struggle and
funneled into social movements can begin to work towards
addressing the underlying causes of poverty.

7fi.
See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. 1. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (19RR). While I
agree with the thrust of this article, the critique of rights is too harsh. This theory
of dialogic empowerment should be read by all legal advocates for the poor, but it
may be too optimistic.
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In addition to fulfilling the promise of establishing
individual legal rights, we need to think about expanding legal
right entitlements beyond those currently established. Legal
right entitlements in welfare, insofar as material benefits are
concerned, have generally been limited to: (1) modest cash
assistance to eligible categories of persons such as families with
dependent children (AFDC) and the disabled (SSI); (2) food
stamps; and (3) medicaid.
It is entirely realistic to look towards expanding
entitlement benefits beyond this present limited scope.
However, it will be necessary to look largely to Congress and
state legislatures to create entitlement rights because the
Supreme Court is unlikely to recognize rights unless there is
fairly explicit legislative action or a change in public
consensus. 76 There is, however, the possibility of using state
courts and state laws in some instances to create rights to
benefits. 77
Some have suggested that the original goal of legal rights
was the recognition of the right to a minimum income. 78 That
never developed either through the courts or Congress and, at
the present, the public support for such a proposal is very low.
Although the present make-up of the United States Supreme
Court makes it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would
recognize such a right, writers, such as Peter Edelman, have
suggested that the theoretical foundation be laid now since it is
realistic that a fundamentally different Court could exist in the
future. 79 For the present, however, it is unlikely that there
will be much progress in the area of a minimal income.
One possibility that is probably more realistic is developing
the concept of the right to a job. Those advocating reform of the
welfare system often suggest that jobs will have to be provided
by the government because the economy cannot create enough
jobs and is subject to too many fluctuations. 80 It will be easier
to develop the political support for the right to a job rather
than a right to a minimum income because of the strong work
ethic in our national conscience. The right to a job would

Sard, supra note 10, at 375.
ld. at 381.
See, e.g., FRANCES F. PIVENS & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE POLITICS OF
TURMOIL (1965).
79.
Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987).
80.
Ellwood, supra note 3, at 124.
76.
77.
78.
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require that the government create jobs whenever and
wherever the economy could not provide jobs through the
private sector. Of course, to be a meaningful right, the right to
a job would require that the right be to a decent job at a decent
wage.
It is also realistic to begin to recognize the right to health
care, day care, and housing for all Americans. Medical
assistance coverage can be expanded or merged with a national
health care system. While health care is not a poverty issue by
itself it is an area where the interests of the poor and other
classes merge. The right to day care for all of the working poor
is an area where political support is continuing to grow. The
idea of some type of minimal housing as a right for the
homeless is also gaining acceptance.
Once these social programs become established and people
grow accustomed to and dependent on them, they will become
rights which, although legislatively created, will acquire public
support, making them as valuable as other rights that the
public now takes for granted. The ideas put forth here are only
the most obvious ones for creating an expanded list of legal
entitlements and is not meant to be exhaustive. The political
struggle will ultimately determine which of these and other
ideas are accepted or rejected.
All rights, of course, imply that someone has corresponding
obligations. One way of expanding beyond our present reliance
on rights is to focus more attention on the obligations of those
bureaucrats who bear official responsibilities and duties in the
area of social welfare. In this respect, one looks at the actions
bureaucrats are required to take and the outcomes that they
are responsible for.
Bureaucratic obligations can be greatly expanded.
Bureaucrats can be expected to be evaluated on how they fulfill
their obligations. Obligation-based controls on bureaucrats
allow oversight that is less dependent upon the welfare client
to exercise control. 81 In order for this approach to work, we
must establish criteria for evaluation that considers the effect
of all bureaucratic action on the poor. For instance, instead of
evaluating a welfare agency simply on the present quality
control criteria, which focuses largely on the number of
ineligibles receiving benefits, one could turn it around and
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evaluate the agency on the number of those who are turned
down or turned away at the door who were, in fact, eligible. 82
For jobs programs, one could look at the number of persons
who received long term, not temporary, good paying jobs.
Incentives can be built into the system for those agencies who
have the best outcomes. This is the "carrot" approach where
agencies and states are positively reinforced for their outcomes.
In addition to incentives for outcomes, some agencies will
need the "stick" approach as well as the carrot. Where agencies
disregard the legal rights of those it is supposed to serve there
may have to be fines and penalties. If welfare recipients are to
be penalized under the guise of welfare fraud when they make
mistakes, perhaps welfare bureaucrats should face punitive
action when they callously disregard the law in denying or
restricting benefits to the poor. Compensatory and punitive
damages could be awarded when states, agencies or welfare
bureaucrats ignore the law. The use of writs of mandamus
should be expanded to require reluctant bureaucrats to carry
out their statutory obligations.
By imposing and enforcing bureaucratic obligations we will
ensure that administrators are held responsible for agency
decisions. Responsible administrators will focus on the duties
and obligations they have to develop agencies responsive to the
needs of the poor. This will be one step towards the responsible
use of discretion and decentralization.
Another way of expanding the scope of legal rights is to
begin to look beyond individual legal rights to group rights.
The concept of group rights suggests that groups can possess
rights and enforce them irrespective of individual
applications. s:l Courts have indirectly recognized group rights
by granting them remedies for racial discrimination. 84 The
idea of discrimination in employment law, for example,
presupposes that groups have rights.
Group rights have also been indirectly recognized when
class action suits have resulted in broad remedies wherein
refunds have been ordered to a "group" of consumers. Groups,
such as industry employees, could be protected by legislation

H2.
See Timothy J. Casey & Mary Mannix, Quality Control in Public Assistance:
Victimizmg the Pour Through One-Sided Accountability, 22 CLEARIN<;HOUSE REV.
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restricting plant closings and corporations moving out of the
state or country. Whether groups are naturally formed as
groups of Mro-Americans and American Indians or artificially
formed such as consumer or poverty groups, both legislatures
and courts can expand benefits and remedies to broad groups
that have otherwise fared poorly in the political struggle. The
development of group rights will be slow as society sorts out
the obligations owed and the groups to be protected. 85 It
requires the re-evaluation of the public's view of the duty owed
to the weak in society. Such embedded ideology will change
only slowly and therefore expansion of rights to groups will, as
a practical matter, come only slowly.
The content and scope of legal rights will ultimately be
determined through the political struggle. In order to build
political support to reverse the subversion of legal rights and to
expand the scope beyond the present individual legal rights, it
will be necessary for the poor to seek a convergence of interests
with other social and political groups. To seek a convergence of
interests is to find a common ground of interests and to work
together in the political arena for a solution.
The history of the last twenty-five years suggests that the
poor will need the help of other interest groups in political
alliances to gain any large degree of political power. As much
as many advocates for the poor feel that the poor themselves
need to become empowered and rise up to demand significant
change of the social and economic conditions that keep them in
poverty, it has become apparent to most of them that while the
problems facing such a task are not insurmountable, they are
extremely imposing. The best chance for empowerment of the
poor rests in their finding common ground with other interest
groups and classes. The social movements of the poor must be
converged with those of other groups and classes, where
possible, in order to create wider based social programs. This is
not to say that we should abandon all means-tested programs
but that, in some instances, broader programs will have
broader political support and hence not be subject to subversion
by conservative administrations. 86

85.
See ALLAN C. HUTCHINGSON, LAW AND COMMUNITY (1989) (An especially
guud article is by Mark Tushnet, "Law and Group Rights: Federalism as a
Model.").
86.
William Julius Wilson argues for a comprehensive program that combines
employment policies with social welfare policies and that features universal as
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The broadest area for developing a convergence of interests
is in the common interest of the working class and even the
middle class. The common interests can be developed in a
number of areas. Many economic interests are shared by these
different classes. The working class and the poor often share a
common interest in preventing the abandonment by businesses
of the inner cities, government supports and subsidies for
creating jobs, adequate daycare, expanded medical care, and
adequate wages for work. Another common interest among the
poor, the working class, and the middle class is the interest in
seeing that the wealthy pay a larger share of taxes.
The poor must also continue to develop a convergence of
interests with feminists. The "feminization of poverty" is real
and the majority of poor families are now headed by women. 87
In many respects the interests of the feminists are the same
interests as those of the poor because so many women are poor.
Feminists and poor women share an interest in many policy
areas including ending sex discrimination in the labor force,
expanding job training for women, promoting equal pay for
equal work, enforcing child support obligations, and providing
affordable quality daycare. Feminists and the poor must begin
to form an alliance to use the political process to address their
common concerns. Feminists in the legal system, as lawyers
and judges must use their influence in the legal system to give
broad meaning to the rights of women.
As interests are converged solutions will be proposed that
solve the broader interest. These solutions will have the broad
political support necessary to get programs and laws enacted.
The legal rights of the poor will be rights supported by larger
interests and will not be subject to the degree of subversion
that is possible when legal rights are more narrowly drawn.

VII. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE HOLD?
The Family Support Act of 198888 (hereinafter FSA) will
affect the welfare system in many respects that will influence
legal rights. 89 A major part of the Act is its emphasis on job
opposed to race- or group-specific strategies. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTA<:IW (1987).
87.
See S. SKOG, REAGONOMICS, WOMEN AND POVERTY IN POVERTY AND SOCIAL
JUb"''ICE (1987); GERTUDE SCHAFFERS & ELEANOR KREMEN, THE FEMINIZATION OF
POVERTY (1990).
88.
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2342 (1988).
89.
See Timothy J. Casey, Family Support Act of 1988, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
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training. States are required to set up job programs with the
goal of requiring AFDC recipients to work. Success of this
program will be dependent on the ability of the states to create
or find jobs for recipients. Therefore, it will be especially
important for advocates of the poor to focus on the right to a
decent job. Some people will find jobs as welfare recipients
have always done but the goals will largely be unmet because
the Act does not address the economic problems which foster
high unemployment. The common interests of the poor and the
working class must first merge to address the policies of using
recession and high unemployment as the means to fight
inflation.
To some extent the FSA allows states to have discretion
and decentralization in the creation of its JOBS 90 programs.
As I have argued, without adequate budgets and a responsible
administration, this change to discretion and decentralization
will create continued abuses of discretion. Many states will
impose degrading and unreasonable conditions on recipients in
an effort to get them off welfare.
In other areas, the FSA has taken away discretion as all
states will be required to have AFDC-UP programs. 91
However, the states retain the discretion to set benefit levels.
This discretion in benefit levels will continue to result in
tragically low benefit levels in many states. The push to
abandon state discretion and set a national minimum AFDC
standard will likely continue.
Given the present direction of welfare reform, 9 :l we can
expect that the next decade will continue to see a great deal of
discretion in the continued experimentation with training and
employment programs. These will necessarily involve some
individual discretion as the selection of training programs is by
its nature a highly individualistic one. Sanctions will be
imposed on those that do not meet the new expectations. We
can expect that unfairness will creep in to some degree as to
those who are sanctioned as the street level bureaucrat makes
distinctions based upon those he/she feels are deserving or

9:30 (1989).
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-48fi, 102 Stat. 2856-2SH1
90.
(1988).
!d. at 102 Stat. 2~m8-2400 (1988).
91.
92.
See PHOEBE COTIINGHAM & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE POLICY FOR THE
1990s (1989).
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undeserving. There is likely to be a continued shift in program
design, operation and control from the federal to the state level.
Whether this will result in any improvement again will depend
on whether states will provide adequate budgets and whether
the administrators will be working in an environment that
encourages them to act responsibly towards the needs of the
poor. This, in turn, will depend upon the success of the political
struggle, the ability of the poor to form social movements, and
the ability to converge their interests with other groups.
The poor will continue to face a threat to any progress out
of poverty from the political far right in this country. As long
as the far right is successful in convincing the public that the
problem of poverty is simply the problem of individuals who are
deviant or culturally different than the rest of the public any
progress will be limited. The far rights control and shift of the
dialogue should not be underestimated. To a large degree they
have been able to seize the avenues of public discourse in the
past decade to serve their own ends. 93
The task of the poor is formidable. Some would say it is
even insurmountable. But whether or not we continue to see
progress in ending poverty, it is clear that legal rights serve
not as an impediment to change but as a catalyst for change.
Legal rights have given some power and dignity to the
struggles of the poor and its potential has not yet been
realized.

9a.
See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISHMENT (1988);
JOHN SALOMA Ill, OMINOUS POLITICS (1984).

